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Abstract
Product recalls hurt the sales of non-recalled products in the category because of 
negative spillovers. Recently, there has been some evidence of positive spillovers 
from recalls on the sales of non-recalled products. We focus on spillovers from 
brand- (i.e., same brand), firm- (i.e., same firm, but not same brand), and country-
level (i.e., same country-of-origin, but not same firm) recalls on the sales of non-
recalled products. Furthermore, we examine how advertising and price of non-
recalled products interact with brand-, firm-, and country-level recalls to affect 
their sales. We use data on 124 cars in the USA in 2006–2015. Results indicate that 
brand-level (country-level) recalls hurt (benefit) the sales of non-recalled products. 
Higher advertising and price of non-recalled products weaken the negative effect of 
brand-level recalls, while lower advertising and price strengthen the positive effect 
of country-level recalls. Finally, firm-level recalls result in positive spillovers when 
advertising is high.
Keywords Product recalls · Spillovers · Country-of-origin · Automotive industry
1 Introduction
Product recalls hurt the sales of recalled products and of some non-recalled products 
in the category because of negative spillovers (Cleeren et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
as products in a category are substitutes, recalls may, sometimes, benefit the sales of 
non-recalled products.
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Research has examined the negative effects of recalls on recalled products 
(Cleeren et  al., 2008). A narrower stream of research indicates that recalls result 
in negative spillovers for products which are similar to the recalled ones (Borah & 
Tellis, 2016). There is also some evidence of positive spillovers (Zhao et al., 2011). 
Borah & Tellis (2016) find that negative online chatter following a car’s recall 
increases the sales of its nearest rival from another country. This suggests a role for 
products’ country-of-origin (COO) in this context.
We focus on spillovers from brand- (i.e., same brand), firm- (i.e., same firm, but 
not same brand), and country-level (i.e., same COO, but not same firm) recalls on 
the sales of a non-recalled product in the category. Furthermore, we examine how 
advertising and price of the non-recalled product moderate these spillovers.
We select the US passenger cars industry as the empirical context. The data 
include 124 cars in 2006–2015.
This study has three contributions. First, it shows that COO plays a different role 
in recalls’ spillovers than previously suggested. Second, while the literature focused 
primarily on the marketing mix of recalled products, we consider the marketing mix 
of non-recalled products. Third, this research is the first to examine spillovers at 
multiple product hierarchy levels, i.e., brand, firm, and COO. The findings are use-
ful to managers to understand how a (non-recalled) product’s advertising and price 
moderate the effects of other products’ recalls on its sales.
2  Hypotheses
2.1  Definitions
The term “product” (or “make-model”1) refers to a specific car (e.g., Toyota Camry). 
The term “brand” (or “make”) refers to a family of products with a brand name (e.g., 
Toyota). The term “firm” refers to the manufacturer (e.g., Toyota Motor Corporation). 
Finally, the term “COO” refers to the country-of-origin of the firm (e.g., Japan).
Using a product as unit of analysis, “brand-level recalls” are recalls of products 
of the same brand as the focal product, “firm-level recalls” are recalls of products of 
other brands of the same firm as the focal product, and “country-level recalls” are 
recalls of products of other firms from the same COO as the focal product. If Toyota 
Camry is the focal product, the recall of Toyota Corolla is a brand-level recall, the 
recall of Lexus ES is a firm-level recall, and the recall of Honda Accord is a coun-
try-level recall.
2.2  Main effects
We rely on two theories. First, consideration set formation theory (Hauser, 
2014), which posits that consumers, when considering a purchase, first form a 
1 Past research on the automotive industry used make-model and nameplate interchangeably.
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consideration set of products and then choose a product from this set. Second, 
accessibility-diagnosticity theory (Feldman & Lynch, 1988), which posits that, if 
a consumer thinks product A is informative about product B, she will use infor-
mation about A to make inferences about B.
Brand‑level Applications of the accessibility-diagnosticity theory to recalls (Roehm 
& Tybout, 2006) indicate that, when a recall is revealed, its effects are reflected not 
only on the recalled product but also on non-recalled products similar to it on aspects 
related to the recall (e.g., materials, plants, etc.) (Borah & Tellis, 2016). Products of 
the same brand share the same materials, plants (Hora et al., 2011), and esthetic fea-
tures (e.g., BMW Kidney Grille). A recall will change the consideration set of con-
sumers willing to buy the recalled product or a product similar to it. Consequently, 
consumers may exclude from (not include in) their consideration set (Palazzolo & 
Feinberg, 2015) the non-recalled product of the recalling brand, as they may con-
sider it likely to incur recalls itself. Hence, brand-level recalls will decrease the sales 
of the non-recalled product. We do not formally hypothesize this relationship, given 
the extensive evidence for it in the literature (Liu & Shankar, 2015).
Country‑level A product’s COO may affect consumers’ evaluations of specific 
attributes (Johansson et al., 1985). As an example, German cars are considered fuel-
efficient, while US cars are considered powerful (Erickson et al., 1984). However, a 
product’s COO influences consumers’ purchase decisions only when information is 
unclear (Verlegh et al., 2005), serving as a heuristic under conditions of uncertainty.
When a product from a given COO is recalled, consumers who had previously 
included it in their consideration sets may no longer do so along with other prod-
ucts of the same brand. As a result, they will engage in a consideration set substitu-
tion process (Palazzolo & Feinberg, 2015). Consumers may rely on a heuristic to 
develop their new consideration sets (Maheswaran, 1994) and include products from 
the same COO as the recalled product, expecting them to be similar on desirable 
attributes (Johansson et al., 1985) to the excluded products. Anecdotal evidence sup-
ports this mechanism. In 2010, sales of Toyota make-models recalled for accelerator 
problems were down 13%. Toyota Camry midsize sedan, usually the best-selling car 
in the USA, recorded a 20% decrease being outsold by the equally Japanese Honda 
Accord (Bunkley, 2010). Hence:
H1: The higher the number of country-level recalls, the higher the sales of a 
non-recalled product from the country.
We note that this logic runs contrary to Borah and Tellis (2016), who argue that 
consumers make similarity inferences for products from the same COO as they 
expect them to have similar processes of product development, so that country-level 
recalls will lead to negative spillovers. We suggest that this may not be the case as 
this mechanism is more likely to occur at the brand-level. Different firms from the 
same COO do not necessarily share suppliers nor processes, crucial aspects when 
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consumers evaluate a non-recalled product’s likelihood to incur recalls. Moreover, 
products from the same COO are often perceived as sharing attributes such as driv-
ing comfort (Erickson et al., 1984; Johansson et al., 1985), being substitutes in con-
sumers’ consideration sets.
Firm‑level At first blush, it may appear that the mechanism discussed above for 
brand-level recalls also applies to firm-level recalls. The negative information of 
a recall may be regarded as diagnostic of non-recalled products of the same firm. 
Hence, firm-level recalls may decrease the sales of a non-recalled product. However, 
other reasons suggest the opposite. First, brands are often managed autonomously 
from firms (Kalaignanam et al., 2013), sharing neither ownership, production pro-
cesses, nor materials. As a result, negative information of a recall may not spill 
over to non-recalled products of other brands of the same firm. Second, consum-
ers may not be able to ascribe each brand to its firm. This is particularly true in the 
automotive industry (Gorzelany, 2019). If consumers are not aware of the branding 
structure in the category, they may assume the industry has only three levels, i.e., 
product, brand, and COO. As a result, they may (mis)interpret firm-level recalls as 
country-level recalls. Due to these countervailing mechanisms, we remain agnostic 
on the nature of the effects of firm-level recalls.
2.3  Interaction effects
We expect brand-level recalls to differ from country-level recalls on a key aspect. 
When a product of a given brand is recalled, consumers may consider negative infor-
mation diagnostic not only of the recalled product but also of non-recalled products 
of the same brand, whose perceived quality will be negatively affected. Conversely, 
negative information may not be considered diagnostic of non-recalled products of 
different firms from the same COO. Such products’ perceived quality will not be 
negatively affected (see  H1). Against this backdrop, we formulate the hypotheses for 
the interaction effects.
2.3.1  Brand‑level
Advertising Advertising is a signal of quality and can differentiate the non-recalled 
product from the recalled products of the same brand (Xiong & Bharadwaj, 2013). 
As Roehm and Tybout (2006) note, when consumers are primed to consider dif-
ferentiation across products, the recalled product is isolated from non-recalled 
products. Thus, advertising may help the non-recalled product to be retained in the 
consumer’s consideration set, by signaling its superior quality with respect to the 
recalled products of the same brand. Hence:
H2adv: The higher the advertising of a non-recalled product, the weaker the nega-
tive effect of brand-level recalls on its sales.
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Price As with advertising, price is also a signal of quality (Blattberg & Wis-
niewski, 1989). As recalls make safety more salient to consumers (Chen et al., 
2019), and consumers grow less price-sensitive (Zhao et  al., 2011), consum-
ers may interpret a lower price, following brand-level recalls, as a signal of 
low quality as, as mentioned above, non-recalled products are expected to incur 
recalls when products of the same brand are recalled. Hence, we reason that, 
among products of the same brand as the recalled products, those with a higher 
price will be more likely to be included in (chosen from) the consideration set. 
A higher price, in fact, may be perceived as a signal that the non-recalled prod-
uct is of higher quality compared to the recalled products of the same brand, 
weakening the negative effect of brand-level recalls. Anecdotal evidence sup-
ports this mechanism. In 2015, in the 2  months following Honda’s recall of 
Accord and Civic due to airbag problems, discounts for the non-recalled Honda 
Fit were more than halved, resulting in a substantially higher price for consum-
ers. Hence:
H2price: The higher the price of a non-recalled product, the weaker the negative 
effect of brand-level recalls on its sales.
2.3.2  Country‑level
Advertising We expect opposing effects here. On the one hand, higher adver-
tising may signal the quality of non-recalled products from the same COO as 
the recalled products to consumers who have grown more concerned about 
quality following recalls. On the other hand, however, inferred motivations 
may influence the effectiveness of advertising (Eagly et  al., 1978). Higher 
advertising following country-level recalls may backfire as consumers believe 
this to be an opportunistic attempt to take advantage of the misfortune of the 
recalling brand (Cleeren, 2015; Cleeren et  al., 2013; Siomkos et  al., 2010), 
lowering product evaluations. This may explain why advertising for Honda 
Accord went down in the months following the 2010 Toyota recalls. We expect 
the second mechanism to outweigh the first as, as mentioned above, country-
level recalls should not raise concerns regarding the quality of non-recalled 
products and their likelihood to incur recalls.2 Consistent with this reasoning, 
we expect higher advertising to weaken the positive effect of country-level 
recalls. Hence:
H3adv: The higher the advertising of a non-recalled product, the weaker the posi-
tive effect of country-level recalls on its sales.
2 In sum, while we expect a positive main effect of advertising on sales as advertising is a signal of 
quality, we do not expect this mechanism to be manifest in an interaction with country-level recalls. Con-
versely, we expect the positive effect of advertising to be weakened as country-level recalls increase.
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We do not expect this mechanism to hold for brand-level recalls. In the case of 
brand-level recalls, the non-recalled product is of the recalling brand and, as a result, 
cannot be considered opportunistic.
Price Again, we expect opposing effects. On the one hand, a higher price may signal 
the quality of non-recalled products from the same COO as the recalled products to 
consumers who have grown more concerned about quality following recalls. Fur-
thermore, as inferred motivations may influence the effectiveness of price reductions 
(Campbell, 1999), a lower price following country-level recalls may backfire as con-
sumers believe this to be an opportunistic attempt to take advantage of the misfor-
tune of the recalling brand (Chen et al., 2019; Cleeren, 2015; Cleeren et al., 2013; 
Siomkos et al., 2010), lowering product evaluations. As an example, the executive 
VP of Honda’s US subsidiary told dealers, after Toyota’s 2010 recalls: “We will 
not react in a predatory way towards either Toyota or Toyota customers” (Simon & 
Jung-a, 2010). On the other hand, however, a lower price of the non-recalled prod-
uct may strengthen the positive effect of country-level recalls, as consumers may 
choose, among products from the same COO as the recalled products, the one that 
offers superior value, i.e., a lower price. We expect this mechanism to outweigh the 
previous as country-level recalls, differently from brand-level recalls, should not 
raise concerns regarding the quality of non-recalled products and their likelihood to 
incur recalls.3 Consistent with this reasoning, we expect a higher price to weaken the 
positive effect of country-level recalls. Hence:
H3price: The higher the price of a non-recalled product, the weaker the positive 
effect of country-level recalls on its sales.
For the reasons mentioned above regarding the main effect of firm-level recalls, 
we remain agnostic on the interaction effects of firm-level recalls.
3  Method
3.1  Data
We use the US passenger cars industry as the context as numerous make-models can 
be targets of spillovers at any point in time. Passenger cars’ recalls are highly publi-
cized events resulting in consumers’ awareness (PMI, 2015).
We collected data on passenger cars’ recalls in 2005–2014 from the NHTSA.4 To 
focus on recalls of (substantive) brands, we included 21 large brands. These brands 
constitute more than 90% of the sales of passenger cars in each year in 2006–2015. 
3 In sum, we do not expect a lower price to be interpreted as a signal of low quality against the backdrop 
of country-level recalls.
4 https:// www. nhtsa. gov/ recal ls.
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We excluded make-models priced over US $150,000 because they are unlikely to be in 
the consideration set of mainstream shoppers (see Liu et al., 2017 for a similar logic). As 
only sufficiently large recalls are likely to affect perceptions, we excluded recalls involv-
ing less than 15,000 units. Smaller recalls typically involve batches produced in specific 
plants during circumscribed periods (see Cleeren et al., 2013 for a similar logic). When 
the database contained multiple recalls for the same make-model in a month, to avoid 
overcounting, we only considered one recall (Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011).
We collected monthly sales volumes for all make-models in 2006–2015 from 
Wards’ Auto. Wards provides data on attributes, annual manufacturer-suggested 
retail list prices (MSRP), and monthly promotions. Furthermore, we collected data 
on make-model monthly advertising from Kantar.
Finally, for each month, we excluded all make-models that were recalled at least 
once in the previous (rolling) year. This allows us to distinguish the effects of other 
make-models’ recalls from those of the focal make-model. The final sample is a 
panel of 4744 make-model-months in 2006–2015. For a list of make-models, see 
Table A1, Web Appendix A. There are 559 recalls in our sample. On average, each 
month, 4.37 make-models are recalled. Furthermore, each month, there are, on aver-
age, 0.24 recalls per brand, 0.35 per firm, and 0.89 per COO.
3.2  Measures
We provide the descriptions for variables in Table 1 and, in Table B1, Web Appen-
dix B, the descriptives and correlations. All VIFs are below 10.
3.3  Estimation
As data are nested (make-model-month observations are nested in brands, which are 
nested in firms, which are nested in COOs), we estimate a random intercepts mixed 
model. Following prior research (Liu & Shankar, 2015; Liu et al., 2017), we con-
sider attributes (e.g., horsepower, size) to be exogenous. In the automotive industry, 
in fact, attributes are redesigned when a new make-model is introduced, approxi-
mately every 5 years (Palazzolo & Feinberg, 2015). This assumption is reasonable, 
as firms cannot change the attributes of cars in the short-term (Sudhir, 2001).
Advertising and price are presumably endogenous as make-model-level omit-
ted variables may affect both marketing mix and sales. Please see Web Appendix C 
for a discussion of how we mitigate endogeneity concerns using a control function 
approach (Petrin & Train, 2010).
We estimated the following equation:
Salest = μ0 + μ1brand-level recalls5(t-1—t-12) + μ2country-level recalls(t-1—t-12) + μ3firm-
level  recalls(t-1—t-12) + μ4advertising(t-1—t-12) + μ5price(t-1) + μ6brand-level  recalls(t-1—t-12) 
× advertising(t-1—t-12) + μ7brand-level  recalls(t-1—t-12) ×  price(t-1) + μ8country-level 
 recalls(t-1—t-12) ×  advertising(t-1—t-12) + μ9country-level  recalls(t-1—t-12) ×  price(t-1) + μ10
5 In the interest of brevity, we remove the subscript ibfc, where i represents make-models, b brands, f 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































firm-level  recalls(t-1—t-12) ×  advertising(t-1—t-12) + μ11firm-level  recalls(t-1—t-12) ×  price(t-1) + 
∑17
f=12
f controlst  + μ18εA1t + μ19ε A2t + year FEs + month FEs + random effects + ε1t.
where μs are parameter estimates, subscript t months, εA1ts-εA2ts the errors from 
equations c1–c2 (see Web Appendix C), and ε1t observational error. The model 
includes random effects for COO, firm, brand, and make-model. Potentially endog-
enous variables are lagged by 1  month. Standard errors are bootstrapped (200 
replications).
4  Results
We report a main effects’ model in column 1, Table  2. In column 2 we include 
control variables. We report the results for the main model in column 3 (log likeli-
hood =  − 5078.75). Brand-level recalls decrease the sales of the non-recalled product 
(b =  − 0.73, p < 0.05), while country-level recalls increase them (b = 1.62, p < 0.01) 
in support of  H1. There is no effect of firm-level recalls (b =  − 0.70, p > 0.10).
Advertising (b = 0.01, p < 0.05) and price (b = 0.06, p < 0.05) of the non-recalled 
product weaken the negative effect of brand-level recalls, in support of  H2adv and 
 H2price. Furthermore, advertising (b =  − 0.02, p < 0.01) and price (b =  − 0.13, 
p < 0.01) of the non-recalled product weaken the positive effect of country-level 
recalls in support of  H3adv and  H3price. Finally, the effect of firm-level recalls is posi-
tive when advertising is high (b = 0.04, p < 0.01). The interaction between price 
and firm-level recalls is not significant (b = 0.03, p > 0.10). We display the marginal 
effects for the interactions in Figure  D1, Web Appendix D. We report robustness 
checks in Web Appendix E.
5  Discussion
The findings extend the recalls literature. First, while research focused on the effects 
of recalls on recalled products, we extend the narrower literature on spillovers, 
which has hitherto focused on negative spillovers (see e.g., Van Heerde et al., 2007). 
In doing so, we develop a comprehensive model of the effects of recalls by focus-
ing on both negative and positive spillovers. Consistent with previous research (Liu 
& Shankar, 2015), the findings indicate that brand-level recalls reduce the sales of 
non-recalled products. Furthermore, country-level recalls increase the sales of non-
recalled products. In doing so, we identify a silver lining and, indeed, an opportunity 
for non-recalled products in the face of country-level recalls. The finding extends the 
literature on COO effects by showing that they play a different role than previously 
suggested. The results apparently contradict Borah and Tellis (2016), as discussed 
above; we conjecture that our focus on sales (vs. online chatter) may explain this 
divergence. Furthermore, our examination relies on a substantially different sample 
and timeframe.
Second, we depart from the literature, which focused on how recalled products 
can use their marketing mix. In doing so, we focus on how the marketing mix of 
non-recalled products can weaken (strengthen) negative (positive) spillovers.
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Third, this research is the first to separately examine the effects of other prod-
ucts’ recalls at multiple hierarchical levels in a category. While brand- (Roehm 
& Tybout, 2006) and firm-level (Zavyalova et al., 2012) recalls have been inves-
tigated, past research has not distinguished them. Distinguishing across brand-, 
firm-, and country-level recalls allows to disentangle how non-recalled products 
with different degrees of relatedness to the recalled product are likely to experi-
ence spillovers. We show that perceived similarity on processes of product devel-
opment, which we expect at the brand-level, leads to negative spillovers, as con-
sumers will consider a product that shares product development processes with 
the recalled product likely to have defects. Conversely, perceived similarity on 
relevant attributes (e.g., driving comfort), which we expect at the country-level, 
Table 2  Random intercepts mixed model
p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. Regressions include a constant. Year- and month-fixed effects and random 
effects at the make-model, brand, firm, and COO levels are included. Bootstrapped standard errors
Dependent variable: sales
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Unstandardized coefficients (SE) Hypothesized effects
Brand-level recalls  − .04 (.02)**  − .05 (.02)**  − .73 (.29)**
Country-level recalls  (H1) .07 (.02)*** .16 (.02)*** 1.62 (.38)***  + 
Firm-level recalls  − .13 (.03)***  − .03 (.03)  − .70 (.61)
Advertising .25 (.02)*** .26 (.02)***
Price  − 2.52 (.17)***  − 2.25 (.21)***
Brand-level recalls × adver-
tising  (H2adv)
.01 (.005)**  + 
Brand-level recalls × price 
 (H2price)
.06 (.03)**  + 
Country-level recalls × adver-
tising  (H3adv)
 − .02 (.01)*** -
Country-level recalls × price 
 (H3price)
 − .13 (.04)*** -
Firm-level recalls × advertis-
ing
.04 (.01)***
Firm-level recalls × price .03 (.06)
Recalls  − .06 (.05)  − .05 (.05)
MPG .97 (.20)*** .98 (.20)***
Horsepower 1.55 (.18)*** 1.59 (.18)***
Size .90 (.43)** 1.01 (.44)**
Weight .59 (.16)*** .43 (.16)***
Luxury .08 (.07) .09 (.08)
Error—advertising  − .17 (.02)***  − .16 (.02)***
Error—price 2.46 (.27)*** 2.42 (.28)***
Observations 5868 4744 4744
Log likelihood  − 7337.78 -5114.87 -5078.75
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leads to positive spillovers, as consumers will consider a product with the same 
desirable attributes as the recalled product a good substitute for it.
For managerial practice, managers are likely aware that brand-level recalls 
decrease the sales of a non-recalled product. However, higher advertising weak-
ens such negative effect by signaling that the non-recalled product is differ-
ent from the recalled one. Furthermore, a higher price shields the non-recalled 
product from the negative effects of brand-level recalls by reaffirming its quality 
(interestingly, the marginal effects show that, for expensive products, the effect 
of brand-level recalls can be positive). Such findings are useful when multiple 
products are offered under the same brand, as they allow managers to effectively 
weather the negative consequences of brand-level recalls.
Furthermore, managers should be cognizant that country-level recalls 
increase the sales of the non-recalled product. Lower advertising and price 
enhance the positive effect of country-level recalls on the sales of the non-
recalled product. This is useful when products from a given COO are character-
ized by attribute-related stereotypes (e.g., US appliances, Japanese electronics).
The findings show that, at the aggregate level, firm-level recalls do not affect 
the sales of non-recalled products. We reason that only some consumers know 
which firm owns a brand. For them, firm-level recalls display a negative effect, 
paralleling brand-level recalls. Conversely, for consumers who are not aware 
of the branding hierarchy in the category, firm-level recalls display a positive 
effect, paralleling country-level recalls. Interestingly, the marginal effects show 
that the effect of firm-level recalls turns from negative to positive as advertis-
ing increases. We argue that, from a tactical perspective, managers in the auto-
motive industry should try not to emphasize the parent firm of their brand in 
their communication efforts, instead emphasizing its COO. If a make-model of 
another brand from the focal firm is recalled, in fact, make-models of the focal 
brand will be shielded by negative spillovers. Instead, they will experience pos-
itive spillovers, as the recall will be interpreted as a country-level recall.
The findings generate implications for policy-makers. Some recalls are par-
ticularly severe and may damage the economy of a country. We show that, even 
when a recall involves products from a given COO, nothing is lost as non-recalled 
products from the same COO can benefit from it.
Due to the peculiarities of the automotive industry, future research investigat-
ing the generalizability of our findings will be useful.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi. 
org/ 10. 1007/ s11002- 021- 09568-6.
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